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I. INTRODUCTION

When it comes to enforcing international law, justice is not blind. The
enforcers-traditionally the five permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council-like all countries, have domestic constituencies that demand
foreign military intervention to be couched in terms of "national" and
"vital" interests. When a threat to international peace and security is
deemed to lack sufficient self-interests, the participants in a given conflict
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of Higher Education for New York State Governor David A. Paterson. His research focus is
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can find that the enforcers are unavailable or otherwise occupied. In the
meantime, the conflict expands and intensifies until perceptions or on-theground realities change enough to either end the conflict or change the
enforcers' prior assessments. One such situation developed in West Africa
in the 1990s as civil war in Liberia spread northward through Sierra Leone
to Guinea-Bissau. Into this void of international enforcement stepped an
unlikely actor, namely the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), a regional organization wholly dedicated to regional
economic development. The remarkable political impact achieved by this
organization of modest goals and even more modest means demonstrates
the significant role that regional organizations can play in international
legal enforcement and offers insights into contemporary conflicts in Africa
and elsewhere throughout the world.
The story of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone
raises a crucial legal question: what is the proper balance of power
between regional organizations and the United Nations, and which should
take precedence in responding to serious breaches of international law?
Notably, this debate raged long before the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra
Leone and dates back to the founding of the post-World War II
international order. During the drafting of the U.N. Charter in 1945,
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill advocated strongly for a
collective security system organized around several geographic regions,
which would have resulted in a multi-polar infrastructure for dealing with
threats to international peace and security! However, Churchill was outmaneuvered by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and his Secretary of
State Cordell Hull who successfully designed a more global system
centered upon a single United Nations.2
Fifty years later, that post-World War II question returned to
prominence in a post-Cold War setting in which intrastate
conflicts-which the U.N. Charter largely ignores-had become
increasingly common. These internal conflicts carried external
consequences, as was the case in West Africa.' In Sierra Leone, the legal
question of the proper flow of authority was overshadowed by a more
immediate political question of who could and would provide something
resembling security and stability in the midst of ongoing war. Regional

1. James O.C. Jonah, The United Nations, in WEST AFRICA'S SECURITY CHALLENGES:
BUILDING PEACE INA TROUBLED REGION 319 (Adekeye Adebajo ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers
2004).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LOPEZ, SANCTIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR
SECURITY: CHALLENGES TO U.N. ACTION 79 (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2002).
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powerhouse Nigeria, acting under the umbrella of ECOWAS, took the
initiative to lead major interventions in both Liberia and Sierra Leone.4 As
a result, the United Nations found itself responding to several fait
accomplis,and international lawyers found themselves wondering whether
the ad hoc arrangement should be embraced and formalized as a local
enforcement option.5
Despite a mixed record, the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone
demonstrated that a regional organization could intervene both effectively
and legitimately. While the initial intervention in Liberia in 1991 found
itself on a somewhat more shaky legal foundation, by the time an enduring
cease-fire was implemented in 2000 in neighboring Sierra Leone, both
ECOWAS and the United Nations had taken significant legal steps to
impose sanctions as well as to provide precedents for enforcement in the
future should such action prove necessary.6
This Article examines the history and legal framework surrounding the
1997 intervention of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and its relationship within other international organizations,
in particular the United Nations and African Union (AU). It then provides
an overview of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars which triggered
the 1997 ECOWAS intervention to restore elected president Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah to power following a military coup. The international legal
considerations that surrounded this intervention form the crux of this
analysis. Finally the question of the future role of regional organizations
in peacekeeping and peace enforcement is contemplated and new
questions are raised.
II. ECOWAS: FROM ECONOMIC COMMUNITY TO
REGIONAL ENFORCER

The ECOWAS was founded in 1975 for the purpose of achieving the
"accelerated and sustained economic development of Member States." 7

4. Adekeye Adebajo, Pax West Africana? Regional Security Mechanisms, in WEST
293 (Adekeye
Adebajo ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers 2004).
5. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997), 1156 (1998), 1171 (1998) and others all
occurred after the ECOWAS intervention began in 1990.
6. Erica Cosgrove, Examining Targeted Sanctions: Are Travel Bans Effective?, in
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WORDS AND WARS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 212-13 (Peter
Wallensteen & Carina Staibano eds., 2005).
7. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States pmbl., May 28, 1975, 1010
U.N.T.S. 17. The fifteen members of ECOWAS are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, C6te
AFRICA'S SECURITY CHALLENGES: BUILDING PEACE IN A TROUBLED REGION
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Created during the height of the Cold War by sixteen West African
members of the Non Aligned Movement, 8 ECOWAS embodied the belief
that West African economic viability could be accelerated by looking
inward and cooperating regionally. Particularly for smaller, post-colonial
states such as those found in West Africa, membership in an international
organization such as ECOWAS marked an important expression of
sovereignty.9 Notably, the organization had a strictly economic aim, with
the original charter containing no provisions for collective security. 1°
However, three years after its founding, a 1978 Protocol on NonAggression essentially pledged allegiance to the U.N. Charter's
prohibitions on cross-border attacks." By 1981, that trend accelerated
toward a Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense that boldly claimed,
"economic progress cannot be achieved unless the conditions for the
necessary security are ensured in all Member States."' 2 From these modest
roots, ECOWAS members eventually ceded significant portions of their
national sovereignty to an organization which established democracy as
the only legitimate form of government in the region, arranged for a
formalized regional intervention force and declared a responsibility to
intervene "to alleviate
the suffering of the populations" in the event of
13
conflict.
or
disaster
That this evolution occurred as the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra
Leone raged provides ammunition for both sides of the legal argument. For
those dismissing the ECOWAS interventions as illegal, the institutional
changes to the organization during the 1990s evidenced poor decisionmaking on the part of countries under the undue influence of a regional
hegemon (Nigeria).' 4 For those seeing the ECOWAS intervention as a
potentially fundamental shift in the international enforcement order, the
d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, and Togo. Id. Mauritania, a charter signatory, left the organization in 2002. IsAAKA K.
SOUARt, CIVIL WARS AND CouPs D'ETAT IN WEST AFRICA: AN ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND THE

ROOTS AND PRESCRIBE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 22 (University Press 2006).

8. SOUAR, supra note 7, at 22.
9. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995).
10. SOUARE, supra note 7, at 22.
11. Id.
12. Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence pmbl., May 29, 1981, 1690 U.N.T.S.
51.
13. Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peace-Keeping and Security, art. 40, Dec. 10, 1999, ECOWAS DOC. A/P10/12/99.
14. See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, Introduction,in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., Council on Foreign Relations

1993).
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subsequent legal developments affirmed the military developments and
solidified their value as legitimate precedent.
Regardless of one's point of view, the progression is nonetheless
startling. Given the legacy of colonialism on the continent, African
multilateral organizations, starting with the Organization of African Unity
(of which the founding members of ECOWAS were all members), have
closely guarded their sovereignty and strictly adhered to a norm of
nonintervention.15 Civil war in Sudan, Nigeria and wide-scale human
rights abuses in Idi Amin's Uganda in the 1960s and 1970s were all
ignored on the basis of nonintervention. 16 The failed effort in Chad in 1981
represented the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) first and last
peacekeeping effort in response to an internal conflict until recent efforts
in Sudan's Darfur Region (the OAU has since become the African Union).
Given the existence of conflict throughout parts of Africa, several
members of the OAU attempted to establish a standing, multilateral
17
intervention capacity, but consensus could never be achieved.
While such a force proved to be politically infeasible on a continental
level, the Member States of ECOWAS decided to create one at the
regional level. They did so in 1999 by formalizing the previously ad hoc
ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with the Protocol
on Conflict Management. 8 Ultimately, the several small states in West
Africa were particularly vulnerable to the spill-over effects of a conflict in
a neighboring territory.1 9 That vulnerability begat motivation and drove the
integration process forward quickly.
At the United Nations, ECOWAS was and is recognized as a subregional association, and the ECOWAS declarations prior to the 1990
Liberian civil war placed it squarely within the framework of U.N.orbiting multilateral organizations.2" Yet, in the 1990s, ECOWAS departed

15. David Wippman, Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 187 (Lori Fisler

Damrosch ed., Canal on Foreign Relations Press 1993).
16. Jonah, supra note 1, at 320.
17. Comfort Ero, ECOMOG: A Model for Africa? in BUILDING STABILITY IN AFRICA:

CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Centre for Defense Studies ed., 2000).
18. Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peace-Keeping and Security, ch. III, art. 21.
19. Between 1990 and 2007 the Liberian Civil War spread to Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau
sparking massive refugee movements. See Wippman, supra note 15, at 167-68; see CORTR1GHT &
LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 87.
20. The 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non Aggression and the ECOWAS Protocol Relating
to Mutual Assistance in Defense both cite the U.N. Charter in their preambles. The United Nations
recognizes the existence of several regional and sub-regional arrangements. See, e.g., Cooperation
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from the typical trajectory and responded militarily to the threats posed by
civil war without first consulting the U.N. Security Council. 2' How did this
happen?
Il1. THE 1990S: QUESTIONS WITHOUT ANSWERS

The history of the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone begins in
22
neighboring Liberia, where a 1989 civil war threatened regional stability.
In August 1990, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (one of
several technical committees within ECOWAS) created a military force
("ECOMOG") for the purposes of intervention in the Liberian civil war.23
They justified their decision by citing human rights abuses, the threat of
large scale refugees and general regional destabilization. 24 The make-up
of that five country Standing Mediation Committee provides the first in a
string of legal controversies. Its membership was dominated by the
Anglophone members of ECOWAS, with Guinea as the only Francophone
member.25 Despite improving relations and fellow membership in
ECOWAS, strained relations endure between Anglophone and
Francophone countries in West Africa. 26 The ECOWAS response to the
Liberian civil war is proof of this tension.27 Initially, Guinea, along with
Anglophone members Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia, was
alone among the Francophone countries in its support contribution to the
ECOMOG intervention force. 28 Guinea's position reflected its own harsh
reality: neighbor to Liberia, Guinea would and did host the lion's share of

Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping
Environment: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms (Mar. 1999), http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
lessons/Regional%200rganizations.pdf.
21. ECOWAS approved the use of force to restore the Kabbah government in Sierra Leone
in June 1997. Foreign Ministers Communique, June 26, 1997, 9(iii).
22. Jonah, supra note 1, at 321.
23. Id. at 322.
24. Id.
25. Anglophone ECOWAS members include: Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra
Leone. Francophone ECOWAS members include: Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Burkina Faso, C6te
d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Since the post-colonial era, inter-national politics in West
Africa have often revolved around Francophone and Anglophone groupings. See CIA World Fact'
Book, at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html. Languages
spoken in each country can be seen under that country's profile.
26. See, e.g., DAVID KEEN, CONFLICT & COLLUSION N SIERRA LEONE (2005).
27. Id.
28. Wippman, supra note 15, at 168.
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refugees.2 9 By 2001, Guinea was hosting over 300,000 Liberian refugees
and over 120,000 Sierra Leonean refugees.3 ° The term "internal conflict"
proved to be an oxymoron in the West Africa of the 1990s.
The reluctance of other Francophone countries to support the action, in
particular Burkina Faso and C6te D'Ivoire, stemmed at least in part from
suspicion of the intervention's driving force, Nigeria.3 1 Nigeria provided
the majority of the troops and was lead by a General, Ibrahim Babangida,
who shared a personal relationship with Liberian President Samuel Doe.32
Indeed, even the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter voiced his
skepticism with regards to the Nigerian influence. 33 Despite these
misgivings, when conditions worsened in Liberia and President Doe was
killed in 1990, 34 the ECOWAS members called an emergency meeting that
November at which they provided a unanimous after-the-fact endorsement
of the ECOWAS intervention, lead as it was by Nigeria.3 5 When the first
of several cease-fires disintegrated, the November endorsement endured,
and, throughout the rest of the decade, proved remarkably durable.
With President Doe out of the picture and a cease-fire out of the
window, ECOMOG's original mandate as a cease-fire monitoring group
became a play on words. Over the next several years ECOWAS would
lead the fight against Charles Taylor, raising questions about whether
ECOWAS was an impartial mediator, or merely a participant in a civil
war. Some, like Nigerian scholar Alade Fawole claim, "Liberia could have
been saved the avoidable bloodbath if ECOMOG had not intervened."3 6 It
was a fight ECOWAS would not win, as Charles Taylor would eventually
become the President of Liberia in 1997.37 In the intervening years,
Charles Taylor undertook a strategy of expanding the conflict after
determining that it was a disadvantage to limit his efforts (and the

29. Id.
30. CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 85.
31. Adebajo, supra note 4, at 309-10.
32. Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, The Evolution and Conduct ofECOMOGOperationsin West
Africa, in BOUNDARIES OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: THE AFRICAN DIMENsION 108 (Mark
Malan ed., Institute for Security Studies 2000).
33. Some Africans Want U.N.ObserverRole in Liberia, REUTERS, Oct. 7, 1992.
34. E.T. Dowyaro, ECOMOG Operations in West Africa: Principles and Praxis, in
BOUNDARIES OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: THE AFRICAN DIMENSION 130 (Mark Malan ed.,
Institute for Security Studies 2000).
35. Final Communiqud of the First Extra-ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State
and Government of the Economic Community of West African States, Bamako, Mali, Nov. 27-28,
1990.
36. W. ALADE FAWOLE, MILITARY POWER AND THIRD PARTY CONFLICT MEDIATION IN WEST

AFRICA: THE LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE CASE STUDIES 26 (Obafemi Awolowo Univ. Press 2001).
37. Id. at 25.
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accompanying ECOWAS response) to Liberia alone.38 He sponsored the
machinations of his deputy, Corporal Foday Sankoh and his Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, sparking civil war there as well.39
A crucial milestone in that Civil War occurred in 1995 when the Sierra
Leonean government, headed by Captain Valentine Strasser, hired the
South African mercenary firm, Executive Outcomes, to tilt the playing
field back in his favor.4 ° The decision serves to highlight the general lack
of interest by the United Nations, or any other major power, to deploy
large numbers of troops to address the plight of a small West African
nation. The arrival of Executive Outcomes was calming enough to allow
for the November, 1996 signing of the Abidjan accord, brokered by
representatives of the United Nations and the OAU, in addition to the
ECOWAS membership.4"
The accord was signed by, among others, RUF leader Foday Sankoh
and Sierra Leone President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who had been elected
only months before.42 Some scholars have highlighted the questionable
order of operations in a peace process that begins, rather than ends, with
elections.43 However, these elections, regardless of timing, marked a legal
turning point in the ECOWAS interventions. In the years leading up to the
Abidjan accords and the election of Ahmad Kabbah, the members of
ECOWAS had signed the Declaration of Political Principles (1991)" and
subsequently a major revision of the ECOWAS charter (1993), 4" both of
which enshrined democracy (or at least "democratic processes") as the
only acceptable means of government. When President Kabbah was
overthrown by a military junta in 1997, the international response was far
more robust because of the political groundwork already put in place by
ECOWAS. Now there was an identifiable grievance of the type the
international community was more comfortable targeting.
The first significant U.N. response to the situation in Sierra Leone was
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1132, which imposed an oil embargo on

38. DAVID J. FRANCIS ET AL., DANGERS OF CO-DEPLOYMENT: U.N. CO-OPERATIVE
PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA 138 (2005).

39. Id.
40.

DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LOPEZ, THE SANCTIONS DECADE: ASSESSING U.N.

STRATEGIES IN THE 1990S 170 (2000).

41. Id.
42. Abidjan Peace Accord Signatures, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjan
accord.html.
43. See MARK MALAN ET AL., PEACEKEEPING IN SIERRA LEONE 17 (2002).

44. Declaration A/DCL.1/7/91 of Political Principles of the Economic Community of West
African States, Abuja, July 2-6, 1991, art. 6.
45. ECOWAS Revised Charter, Cotonou, 24/7/93, art. 40).
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the country and travel sanctions on the ruling military junta.46 The 1997
resolution expressed "strong support for the ECOWAS Committee" and
called for the removal of the junta in favor of the democratically elected
government.47 The impact was immediate. Within a matter of days, the
U.N. Sanctions succeeded in bringing the combatants to the negotiating
table, yielding the Conakry Agreement which re-instated Kabbah as
president and re-established a cease-fire.48
Despite its immediacy, however, the calming impact of UNSCR 1132
was short-lived. The subsequent years of 1998 and 1999 are best described
as a bloody stalemate with the RUF rebels making periodic gains followed
by the Sierra Leone government pushing them back, however indecisively,
with support from ECOWAS forces. One such reversal on behalf of
ECOWAS resulted in the controversial Lomd Accord of July 1999, which
provided for the introduction of large numbers of U.N. peacekeeping
forces.4 9

U.N. peacekeepers had no discernable calming effect on the RUF
rebels, who viewed the peacekeepers' signature Blue Helmets as attractive
kidnapping targets; over 500 U.N. representatives were taken hostage in
2000 which prompted the introduction of several hundred British Special
Forces in August 2000.50 The British intervention, undertaken outside any
U.N. mandate, marked one of the few militarily decisive actions in the
whole decade of the 1990s in West Africa. The British intervention helped
turn the tide against the RUF and resulted in the return of hostages and
stability gains for the Sierra Leonean government. 5'
The combination of hostage taking and the British intervention
motivated the United Nations to ramp up its effort to the maximum
authorized force of 17,500 peacekeepers by November of 2001.52 That
46. S.C. Res. 1132,
1, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 132 (Oct. 8, 1997).
47. Id.
48. See CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 40, at 172.
49. See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999, availableat http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.
html.
50. CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 77.
51. See id. at 88-89.
52. S.C. Res. 1346, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1396 (Mar. 30, 2001). The U.N. Mission in Sierra
Leone was comprised of a peacekeeping force of increasing size: S.C. Res. 1270, 9 U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999) authorized 6,000 troops; S.C. Res. 1289, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1289
(Feb. 7, 2000) authorized a total of 11,100 troops; S.C. Res. 1299, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1299
(May 19, 2000) increased the authorized force to 13,000; and finally, UNSCR 1346 (3/30/01)
increases the total force strength to 17,500. S.C. Res. 1270, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22,
1999); S.C. Res. 1289, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1'289 (Feb. 7,2000); S.C. Res. 1299, 1,U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1289 (May 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1346, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1346 (Mar. 30, 2000).
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peacekeeping force, the largest in the world at the time, successfully
brought order to the country for the first time in over five years. 3 Free and
fair elections were held in 2002 under the watchful eye of the United
Nations and ECOWAS election monitors, and a special court under both
international and Sierra Leonean jurisdiction was established to try those
"most responsible" for the war crimes and human rights abuses committed
since the original 1996 coup which overthrew President Kabbah.54
Following the elections and the subsequent release of the findings of the
special court in 2005, the Security Council elected to replace its
peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone with a unique development-focused
"Integrated Office" (UNIOSL) In the months that followed, the Security
Council reiterated its desire to work with regional organizations 56 and
established the U.N. Commission which, in 2006 made Sierra Leone
(along with Burundi) the focus of its inaugural work. In many ways, the
tiny West African nation of Sierra Leone provided a laboratory for the
whole of the international legal system.
The overall success that occurred in that laboratory resulted from a
combination of many elements. From the U.N. Security Council
resolutions to the decisive roll played by British special forces, several
actors or groups of actors could ostensibly claim responsibility for the
rescue of Sierra Leone and, more broadly, West Africa. However, as
history demonstrates, when the international community was otherwise
preoccupied, it was ECOWAS that stepped into the void, however
imperfectly. While it was the British and Blue Helmets that turned the
military tide, they could not have done so without the politicalfoundation
created by ECOWAS.

53. See Luis Ramirez, Largest UNPeacekeepingMission to OverseeSierraLeone Elections,
Mar. 29,2002, availableathttp://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sierra/2002/0329pkg.htm
(last modified Sept. 26, 2007).
54. Press Release, Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: The U.N. Security Council Must
Make the Special Court Effective and Viable (Feb. 13, 2001) (on file with the Amnesty
International Library).
55. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1620 [S/RES/1620 (2005)] art. 1.
56. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1631 [S/RES/1631 (2005)] art. 1.
57. For creation of Peacebuilding Commission, see U.N. Security Council Resolution 1645
[S/RES/1645 (2005)]; for focus of work of first year, see Report of the PeacebuildingCommission
on its FirstSession (A/62/137-S/2007/458); see generallyU.N. Peacebuilding Commission website,
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/index.shtml.
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IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

One of the most notable-and controversial-aspects of the ECOWAS
interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone is that the legal justifications
generally followed the realities on the ground. As the ECOWAS
intervention in Liberia progressed, ECOWAS Member States provided it
with an increasingly robust legal foundation: the 1991 Statement of
Political Principles sought to protect human rights and followed the initial
ECOWAS intervention into Liberia, where human rights were injeopardy;
the 1993 Revised Charter codified a regional peacekeeping force which
had already been established in 1990 by the ECOWAS Standing Mediation
Committee; the 1999 Conflict Management Protocol officially created
such a regional peacekeeping force, despite the fact that it had already had
significant involvement in two regional civil wars.58 Similarly, the U.N.
Security Council officially authorized the ECOWAS intervention in
several months after ECOWAS foreign ministers had endorsed the use of
force to restore the Kabbah Presidency.5 9 Two crucial questions arise for
the student of international affairs: were the ECOWAS interventions legal,
and, whether legal or not, were they justified?
Answering these questions requires a more inclusive examination of
international and regional legal enforcement. The starting point for any
such analysis is undoubtedly Chapter VIII (articles 52-54) of the U.N.
Charter. The Charter empowers "regional arrangements," which are never
defined, to cooperate on matters of "maintenance of international peace
and security as are appropriate."6 Reflecting the sentiment that regional
organizations may be better positioned to respond to particular types of
threats, the charter encourages the Security Council to deputize the
regional organizations as it sees fit.6" However, granting this robust role to
regional organizations requires prior authorization from the Security
Council, a requirement not satisfied by ECOWAS in either the Liberian or
Sierra Leonean interventions.62 Article 53(1) states that "no enforcement
action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies
without the authorization of the Security Council."6 3 Given the lack of

58. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 36-37; see also Treaty of ECOWAS, July 24,
1993, availableat http://www.comm. ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id--treaty&lang-en (last modified
Apr. 14, 2007).
59. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1132 [S/RES/i 132 (1997)] in October and Foreign
Ministers Communiqu6, supra note 21, 9(iii), in June.
60. U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 1.
61. Id. para. 3.
62. Id. art. 53, para. 1.
63. Id.
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ambiguity in the Charter's black letter law, some scholars conclude the
ECOWAS actions were illegal.'
Notably, however, the failure of ECOWAS to receive such
authorization did not mean its intervention was rejected by the Security
Council, nor did the absence of prior authorization mean the absence of
any authorization at all. In fact, Security Council Resolution 1132
(October 8, 1997) invokes chapter VIII and explicitly "authorizes
ECOWAS, cooperating with the democratically-elected Government of
Sierra Leone, to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of this
resolution relating to the supply of petroleum ... and arms."65 Therefore,
despite the lag between the initial intervention in the summer of 1997 and
the subsequent authorization in the fall of that same year, the ECOWAS
intervention achieved at least some measure of retroactive endorsement.
The members of ECOWAS eventually made the internal determination,
following their experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone, that they preferred
this retroactive arrangement to that contemplated by the U.N. Charter.66 In
1998, during the preliminary negotiations for the landmark Conflict
Management Protocol, the ECOWAS defense ministers met in Banjul,
Gambia to discuss the issue of U.N. Security Council Authorization. 67 As
Nigerian scholar Adekeye Adebajo notes, "ECOWAS leaders determined
in the end that, based on the extreme reluctance of the Security Council to
Sanction U.N. peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau,
it would be better for ECOWAS to retain autonomy of the decision to
intervene. 68 Indeed, the 1999 Conflict Management Protocol requires no
U.N. authorization to issue an intervention mandate.69
Regardless of the ECOWAS perception of the Security Council, the
Security Council regarded the situation in Sierra Leone as a "threat to
international peace and security."7" The determination had important legal
consequences. Given the finding of a threat to international peace and
security, one could view the intervention in Sierra Leone as a collective
security arrangement whereby ECOWAS acted to provide collective selfdefense upon request (as defined by Article 51), to Sierra Leone in

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Wippman, supra note 15, at 186; SOUARE, supra note 7.
S.C. Res. 1132, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 132 (Oct. 8, 1997).
Adebajo, supra note 4, at 302.
See supra text accompanying note 37.
Adekeye Adebajo, Pax West Africana?, in WEST AFRICA'S SECURITY CHALLENGES:
BUILDING PEACE IN A TROUBLED REGION, 302 (Adekeye Adebajo ed., 2004).
69. See ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security art. 27.
70. S.C. Res. 1132, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 132 (Oct. 8, 1997).
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response to a cross-border attack by Liberia.7 While the Liberian army
proper did not at any time during the 1990s mount an attack on
neighboring Sierra Leone, it is well documented that Charles Taylor, in his
capacity as Liberian President starting in 1997, provided material support
to RUF rebels against the Sierra Leone government.72 Such cross-border
interference was forbidden under the 1978 ECOWAS protocol which
invokes article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and a similar provision of the
OAU charter (both of which enshrined non-intervention). 7 It further
asserts that Member States shall refrain from "committing, encouraging or
condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial
integrity or political independence of the other Member States. 7 4 Such a
threshold was surely met and surpassed by Charles Taylor's interference
in Sierra Leone.
Further, ECOWAS' 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense
declared that "Member States resolve to give mutual aid and assistance for
defence against any armed threat or aggression," a sweeping requirement
explicitly including the "case of internal armed conflict within any
Member State engineered and supported actively from outside likely to
endanger the security and peace in the entire [ECOWAS] Community. 75
While the condition of active external support may not have applied to the
Civil War in Liberia, it most certainly did apply to Charles Taylor's
involvement in Sierra Leone. When the ECOWAS foreign ministers met
in special session to respond to the overthrow of President Kabbah in
1997, they released a communiqu6 stating that "the objectives of
ECOWAS [were] the restoration of peace and security and the settlement
of problems relating to refugees and displaced persons. 76
As a practical matter, the possibility of ECOWAS mounting a new
offensive intervention in Liberia, where it had just spent years fighting to
establish stability, was out of the question. However, the fact that the
overthrown Sierra Leonean President Kabbah appealed to the United
Nations for support, coupled with the chapter VII finding and the cross-

71. U.N. Charter art. 51.
72. See, e.g., KEEN, supra note 26, at 216; Ero, supra note 17 (adding that Taylor used a
network of mostly Ukrainian mercenaries to support the RUF efforts in Sierra Leone).
73. ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression art. 2, Apr. 22, 1978.
74. Id.
75. ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance to Defense, arts. 3-4, May 29, 1981,
availableathttp://www.iss.co. za/af/regorg/unity tounion/pdfs/ecowas/13ProtMutualDefAss.pdf
(last modified June 11, 2004).
76. Final Communiqu6, ECOWAS Special Meeting of Foreign Ministers, June 26, 1997 at
Conakry, Republic of Guinea,
9, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/OtherConflict/ECOWAS-062697.html (last modified May 18, 2008).
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border aggression of Charles Taylor does provide some credence to the
immediate necessity of the military response undertaken by ECOWAS. As
such, it provides a measure ofjustification for the ECOWAS actions which
pre-empt the Security Council's authorization.
Some legal analysts reject the cumulative effect of the several legal
justifications provided above. For example, W. Alade Fawole takes issue
with the ECOWAS attempts to reinstate President Kabbah after he became
essentially a president in name only:
The legitimate civilian government of Tejan Kabbah which had
been overthrown could not be said to still enjoy the sovereignty to
call on ECOWAS for an intervention... ECOWAS had no powers
under its charter or any of its existing protocols to remove a de
facto government, no matter by what illegitimate means that
government had come into being.77
Fawole's assertion is factually accurate in the sense that President Kabbah
had indeed been effectively overthrown and ECOWAS-driven negotiations
sought to convince the Junta (led by General Johnny Paul Koromah) to
allow President Kabbah back into power.78 However, the argument ignores
two important developments: one captured in the ECOWAS Charter's
dedication to democratic rule and the second, occurring after the fact with
the 1999 Conflict Management that called upon members to re-instate
wrongly overthrown democratic leaders.
Article 4 of the ECOWAS charter, as revised in 1993, reads,
"promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in
each Member State" is one of several "fundamental principals."79 The
charter further mandates that states "take appropriate measures to ensure
effective application of the provisions of this Treaty."8 This commitment
to democracy echoed the 1991 ECOWAS Statement of Political Principles
which endows each ECOWAS citizen with the "inalienable right to
participate by means of free and democratic processes in the framing of the
society in which he lives."'" Clearly, then, given an "inalienable right" first
77. FAWOLE, supra note 36, at 40.
78. See James Rupert, Sierra Leone Junta Leader Refuses to Abdicate Power; Denial of
Civilian Rule Stalls Regional Talks, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at A23.

79. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, art. 4, July 23, 1993,
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/ecowasfta.pdf (last modified Nov. 8,
2006).
80. Id. art. 56.
81. ECOWAS 14th Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, July
4-6, 1991: Declaration ADCL. 1/7/91 of Political Principles of the Economic Community of West
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identified by the protocol and then violated by the military junta, Fawole's
criticism of the de facto situation ignores the de jure requirements to
which Sierra Leone and its neighbors all agreed.
This de facto/de jure split is explicitly addressed in ECOWAS' 1999
Conflict Management Protocol, adopted after nearly a decade of
experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone. As article 45 bluntly asserts, "[i]n
situation where the authority of government is absent or has been seriously
eroded, ECOWAS shall support processes towards the restoration of
political authority. 8 2 This post-conflict roll-back responsibility provides
a direct response to the Fawole criticism leveled against ECOWAS in its
initial efforts. Again, the pattern of after-the-fact legal justification, while
hardly ideal theoretically speaking, plays a central role in the history of
ECOWAS, and indicates a learning and formalizing process. Ultimately,
it lends the action itself greater legitimacy as well as strengthens the
precedent.
But, the question arises, precedent for what? It is important to note that
the references to individual and inalienable rights to democratic
participation in government included in the 1991 Declaration of Political
Principles exceed the grants of the U.N. charter.8 3 This suggests that there
would necessarily exist some case in which ECOWAS would be obligated
by its own law to intervene where the United Nations, regardless of the
political atmosphere in the Council, would not. The 1999 Conflict
Management Protocol's assertion that "ECOWAS shall intervene to
alleviate the suffering of the populations and restore life to normalcy in the
event of crises, conflict and disaster,, 84 amounts to a responsibility to
protect, something oft contemplated but never formalized at the United
Nations. As such, our analysis, comes full circle to the question of
oversight: what check is there on ECOWAS' decision making process, and
should there be any?
In seeking to answer these central questions, it is informative to look
to other countries and to examine the conditions and consequences of other
contemporaneous conflicts. Like the 1997 ECOWAS intervention in Sierra
African States, art. 6.
82. ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security art. 45, Dec. 10, 1999, availableathttp://www.iss.co.za/af/
regorg/unitytounion/pdfs/ecowas/ConflictMecha.pdf (last modified June 11, 2004).
83. While the 1991 Declaration of Political Principles (Economic Community of West
African States Fourteenth Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja July
4-6 [ADCL. 1/7/9 1]) cites a belief in "the liberty of the individual and in his inalienable right to
participate by means of free and democratic processes in the framing of the society in which he
lives," (principle 6), no such commitment to democracy per se can be found in the U.N. Charter.
84. Id. art. 40.
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Leone, the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo proceeded on the authority
of the regional organizations involved." Similarly, both organizations
featured a dominant member that provided the bulk of both materiel and
political heft (Nigeria in ECOWAS and the United States in NATO).
Finally, both organizations authorized interventions without the normal
prerequisite of Security Council authorization.86 Crucially, following the
American-led intervention in Kosovo, the international community
generally accepted the intervention.87 A notable example of that
acceptance is the high-profile Independent International Commission on
Kosovo which, in 2000, reported to Secretary General Kofi Annan that
"NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate."88 The finding,
occurring precisely as the ECOWAS force transitioned over to U.N.
peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, has important implications for the analysis
of the ECOWAS efforts and their contribution to future precedent. As
David Wippman describes it, the international community, responding to
the ECOWAS efforts as they ultimately did to the NATO efforts in
Kosovo, "validated the result without formally validating the means."89
But Wippman's attempt to separate means and ends may prove too
artificial to withstand the test of time. History has demonstrated the power
of precedent again and again, and the relatively successful outcomes in
Sierra Leone (which is currently at peace under the leadership of a
democratically elected representative) and Kosovo (which has achieved
relative peace, halted ethnic cleansing and made strides toward
independence from Serbia) are more likely to provide retroactive
justification for the means utilized, regardless of the nuanced views
adopted by international legal scholars.
V. PEACE AGREEMENTS

The various peace agreements brokered by ECOWAS and the warring
parties in Liberia and Sierra Leone shared in common the fact that hardly

85. See, e.g.,Nato & Kosovo: Historical Overview, at www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B.
86. For NATO authorization without U.N. authorization, see, e.g., Roger Cohen, NATO
Opens Way to StartBombing in Serb Province,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, http://query.nytimes.
com/gst/fullpage.htil?res--9DO2EEDC 173AF930A25753C1A96E958260&scp=2&sg=NATO%20
approves%20bombing%20kosovo&st=cse. For ECOWAS authorization without U.N.
authorization, see supra note 21, preceding UNSCR 1132.
87. EDWARD NEwMAN, A CRISIS IN GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS? MULTLATERALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL SEcuRITY 70 (Routledge 2007).
88. Id.
89. Wippman, supra note 15, at 175.
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any of them ever stuck. From the initial 1996 Abidjan agreement which
called for free elections and resulted in the Kabbah presidency, to the 1999
Lom6 accord which awarded government positions to RUF leadership,
each temporary cease-fire was haunted by a quick return of hostilities.90
Many scholars point to the lack of sufficient enforcement capability by the
ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). As David Cortright
and George Lopez describe, "[i]n one of the most impoverished regions of
the world, with both Sierra Leone and Liberia ravaged by war, the means
for enforcing sanctions simply did not exist."'"
While Cortright and Lopez's point can hardly be refuted, the series of
cease-fires brokered by ECOWAS between 1996 and 1999 provided the
political foundation upon which the subsequent and ultimately more
successful cease-fires were based. As such, ECOWAS, despite its
enforcement deficiencies, demonstrated how regional organizations can set
the table for more capable interveners such as the United Nations or the
British Special Forces. It is in this context that one must examine the
progression of peace agreements in Sierra Leone.
The initial agreement between the RUF and Government of Sierra
Leone ended five years of civil war dating back to 1991. That agreement
introduced several principles which would reappear throughout the
duration of the conflict. The first was the centrality of democracy.9 2 In an
introduction that declared both parties "[d]edicated to the advancement of
democratic development," the Abidjan peace agreement echoed those
region-wide pronouncements such as the 1991 Statement of Political
Principles and the 1993 Revised Charter.93 The Second was an attempt to
convert the RUF into a political party which would participate in the
recently established democratic arena.94 While some would condescend
that "it is hard to portray the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
convincingly as a political movement," the effort nonetheless would
remain a centerpiece of future negotiations. Indeed, in its response to the

90. See Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), Sierra Leone-RUF/SL, Nov. 30, 1996,
availableat http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_ 10301996.html (last visited Sept. 28,
2008) [hereinafter Abijdan Peace Agreement]; see also supra note 49.
91. PETER

WALLENSTEEN

&

CARINA

STAIBANO,

THE ROLE

OF

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WORDS AND WARS IN THE GLOBAL

SYSTEM 153 (2005).
92. Economic Community of West African States Fourteenth Session of the Authority of
Heads of State and Government, Abuja July 4-6 [A/DCL. 1/7/9] principle 6.
93. Abijdan Peace Agreement, supra note 90; ECOWAS, Revised Treaty, July 24, 1993,
availableat http://www.worldtradelaw.net/ fta/agreements/ecowasfta.pdf.
94. Abidjan Peace Agreement, supra note 90, art. 13.
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coup that overthrew President Kabbah in 1997 and ended the Abidjan
cease-fire, the U.N. Security Council reaffirmed "its view that the Abidjan
Agreement (S/1996/1034) continues to serve as a viable framework for
peace, stability and reconciliation in Sierra Leone." 95 Here again, the
efforts of a regional organization, however limited in efficacy, served to
provide the political framework to which the international community
could react.
The Lomd Peace Agreement of 1999 echoed its Abidjan predecessor96
and reaffirmed the role of ECOWAS as 'first responder' in West Africa.
Lomd reaffirmed the viability of the Abidjan agreement, called for
democracy and attempted to transform the RUF into a political party.97
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the effort met with a similar fate. The Lomd
Accords are notable not only for rehashing failed previous efforts, but also
for their controversial foray into amnesty. According to the agreement, not
only would RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh and his cohorts receive
"absolute and free pardon," but they would also take control of four
government ministries including the all-important chairmanship of the
board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, that
is, the diamond mines. 9s The highly criticized arrangement, in particular
its amnesty clauses, was subject to a reservation by the U.N. representative
involved with the negotiations, and prompted Secretary General Kofi
Annan to report, "amnesty cannot be granted in respect of international
crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or other serious
violations of international humanitarian law." 99 The U.N. reservation
paved the way for a Special Court which now operates under a dualjurisdiction ofboth international and Sierra Leonean law."0 ' Foday Sankoh
of the RUF, Charles Taylor of Liberia and several others were all indicted
by the court in 2002, despite the amnesty provisions found in the Lomd
Accords. lO!

95. S.C. Res. 1132, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 132 (Oct. 8, 1997).
96. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), Sierra Leone-RUF/SL, July 7, 1999, availableat http://www.usip.
org/library/pa/sl/sierraleone_07071999.html (last visited Sept. 28,2008) [hereinafter Lome Peace
Accord].
97. Id.
98. Id. art IX(I).
99. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Establishmentofa Special
Courtfor SierraLeone, 22, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
100. See, e.g., David A. Mundis & David Stoeltling, The Creation of a New Ad Hoc
International Criminal Tribunal and Other International Efforts to Prosecute Violations of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 35 INT'L LAW, 631, 631 (2001) (discussing the Special Court).
101. FRANCIS ET AL.,supra note 38, at 148.
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By the time the United Nations began arriving in force in 2000, the
situation was ripe for a more durable peace agreement. The paired Abuja
Accords (the first occurring in November, 2000 and the follow-up
conference in May 2001) followed some of the worst fighting of the
conflict as well as extensive hostage taking by the RUF of up to 500 U.N.
soldiers. 1 2 The introduction of large numbers of U.N. troops in 2000 had
an undeniable effect on the negotiating positions of the parties and the
staying power of the eventual agreement. However, it is vital to note that
the Abuja Accords closely mirrored those of Abidjan in 1996 and Lomd
in 1999.103 Without the foundation of Abidjan and Lom6, it would stretch
the imagination to believe that the Abuja accords could have been
implemented as smoothly or effectively as they were. Even more
fundamentally, there would likely have been no negotiating 'partners' in
the absence of the ECOWAS intervention. Instead, there would likely be
a military government under the control of the RUF or an ongoing civil
war. The history of West Africa in the late 1990s demonstrates that the
ECOWAS intervention was a necessary, albeit insufficient condition for
lasting peace in Sierra Leone.
VI. THE ROLE OF NIGERIA: REGIONAL HEGEMON OR
GOOD SAMARITAN?

When examining the legal and political implications of the ECOWAS
intervention in Sierra Leone, it is easy to overlook the reality that these
events occurred in one of the poorest regions in the world. As Cortright
and Lopez noted in 2005, "Sierra Leone has the dubious distinction of
being the world's poorest and least developed nation. It ranks last on the
U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) human development index and
has a per capita GDP of only $167. ' '1o4 The nations surrounding it were
barely better off. It is in this context one must consider the role of
ECOWAS and in particular, its most powerful member, Nigeria.

102. See, e.g., Christopher S. Wren, U.N. Troops Brace to Defend Capital of SierraLeone,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2000, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res9901E5D9163BF932A25756COA9669C8B63&scp=5&sq=UN%20peacekeepers%20taken%20
hostage%20by/o2Osierra%2Oleone%20rebels&st-cse.
103. The preamble to the Abuja accords explicitly reaffirms the ECOWAS "commitment to
the Lom6 Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999" and both the 1999 Lomd and 1996 Abidjan accords,
like the Abuja Accords, employed the same combination of a cease-fire coupled with an attempt
to integrate the RUF into political system. See Abidjan arts. 1, 5, 17; see Lom6, arts. 1 & 3.
104. David Cortright etal., The Role of Intemational Organizations in International Sanctions:
Between Words and Wars in the Global System 153 (Frank Cass ed., 2005).
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The extent of Nigerian influence on the ECOWAS interventions of the
1990s is hard to overestimate. During the conflicts in question, Nigeria
was the only ECOWAS Member State with any heavy military air- or sealift capacity.'05 Nigeria provided the impetus for the initial creation of the
Standing Mediation Committee which it then used to justify intervention
in Liberia.'06
Nigeria was the primary motivator for both the Liberian and Sierra
Leonean interventions, providing the majority of troops and funding for
the most actions. According to Adekeye Adebajo, a scholar of West
African politics, "Nigeria provided at least 80% of ECOMOG's troops
(12,000 out of 16,000 in Liberia and 12,000 out of 13,000 in Sierra Leone)
and 90% of its funding ... [I]ts treasury released billions of dollars for
both ECOMOG missions, and the country suffered an estimated 1,000
fatalities.' 1 7 Further, although Member States were responsible for
furnishing their troops with arms, food, transport and communication
equipment, Nigeria provided gasoline and lubricants to the whole force.' 08
At times, the line between a Nigerian intervention and a regional
intervention proved difficult to discern.
In the face of this domineering stance vis-d-vis the other ECOWAS
members, one is forced to ask, as Lori Fisler Damrosch does, "should the
dominant regional power, Nigeria, be commended for taking the lead role
in peacekeeping, or condemned for interposing a military force to
influence another state's internal struggle?"' 0'9 International legal scholars
have had difficulty finding satisfactory answers to this question. Some
suggest that "perhaps there is a need to recognize Nigeria as a 'benign
hegemon' on the continent, ' while others doubt the possibility of such
a role, parodying Nigeria's "hegemony on a shoestring."'' Some criticize
Nigeria's role in extending the conflict in Liberia while others point to the
paradox of Nigeria-governed by an authoritarian regime until
1999-purportedly intervening in Sierra Leone for the sake of protecting
the democratic process." 2

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Khobe, supra note 32, at 108.
Id. at 109.
Adebajo, supra note 68, at 293.
Khobe, supra note 32, at 117.

LORI FISLER DAMROSCH, Introduction, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 19 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., Council on Foreign

Relations 1993).
110. Jonah, supra note 1, at 340.
111. ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, LIBERIA'S CIVIL WAR: NIGERIA, ECOMOG, AND REGIONAL
SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA 247 (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2002).
112. See, e.g., Khobe, supra note 32, at 103 (discussing the process of ending the nine-year
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However, the results do not appear to support the rhetoric. Despite
Nigeria's clear preponderance of power in the region, interventions in
Liberia and Sierra Leone did not provide her with tangible gains aside
from enhanced regional stability and security-clearly stated objectives of
ECOWAS-and perhaps regional prestige.' 13 The cost to Nigeria for
achieving such stability was, in fact, far higher than for any other Member
State (aside from Liberia and Sierra Leone themselves). Most importantly,
Nigeria's relatively superior power did not provide it with additional
voting power. To continue to operate under an ECOWAS mandate,
Nigeria continued to require support from the ECOWAS membership.
Much criticism revolves around the unprofessional behavior of the
ECOWAS troops, particularly with regards to theft. As one scholar notes,
"ECOMOG acquired such notoriety for looting in Liberia, that it was
nicknamed 'Every Car or Moving Object Gone.' The case of Sierra Leone
was not different.""' 4 Without disputing the truth of this claim, one must
acknowledge that these abuses by the ECOWAS troops evidence a
circumstantial problem more than a structural flaw: a broken compensation
system (and impoverished compensators)
left many ECOWAS soldiers
15
time."'
a
at
weeks
unpaid for
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the salutary role played by
Nigeria is the portrait of an intervention attempted in its absence. When a
third West African conflagration sparked in 1999 in Guinea-Bissau,
Nigeria did not participate" 6 on account of its newly elected representative
government (under Olusegun Obasanjo)" 7 and its already being
overstretched in Sierra Leone. The result, according to one analyst, was a
"debacle," following which ECOWAS had little to show by way of
progress or enhanced peace on the ground." 8 Thus, despite the criticisms
of Nigerian efforts to dominate the region, the region appears to have
welcomed its involvement and been hurt by its absence when dealing with
internal conflicts throughout the region.

war in Sierra Leone); KEEN, supra note 26, at 212.
113. See FAWOLE, supra note 36, at 14 (discussing Nigeria's tradition self-conception as
primus interparesin the region).
114. FAWOLE, supra note 36 at 48.
115. SOUARE, supra note 7, at 186.
116. Adebajo, supra note 4, at 302.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 303.
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VII. CONCLUSION: DEFINING SUCCESS

The situation in Sierra Leone in 1997 was mirrored across the Atlantic
in another tiny, impoverished country: Haiti. There, democratically elected
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by a military junta in a
Member State of a regional organization that touted democratic rule."1 9 In
the cases of both Haiti and Sierra Leone, that regional organization
condemned the development and prompted the U.N. Security Council to
impose Chapter VII sanctions. 2 ° Both Haiti and Sierra Leone suffered
from a lack of sufficient enforcement capacity, exacerbated by
noncompliance of neighboring countries.' 2 '
Yet for all their similarities, the two countries were different in one
crucial way. Haiti shared membership in the Organization of American
States (OAS) with the United States, a prime mover on the U.N. Security
Council, while Sierra Leone had few, if any, standing contacts with any of
the five permanent members of the Council aside from its British colonial
legacy. As such, when additional enforcement was necessary in the
Caribbean Basin, the United States was prepared to establish a naval
blockade of the island and to insert American Marines.' Meanwhile, in
Sierra Leone, Western interest in Africa was distracted by Iraq in 1991 and
deterred by Somalia in 1993. When a substantial peacekeeping force
finally arrived in 2001, the plurality of the contributions came from
Pakistan and Bangladesh. 123 When the British special forces intervened,
they did so of their own accord and without a U.N. mandate. 24 While the
first Security Council resolution in Haiti occurred in June of 1993 and the

119. See, e.g., CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 3, at 99 (discussing regional spoilers in
sanctions regimes in Haiti).
120. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1132 includes in its preamble, "Taking note also ofthe
communique issued at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) on Sierra Leone, held in Conakry, Guinea on June 26, 1997
(S/1997/499). Similarly, U.N. Security Council Resolution 841 (S/RES/841 [1993]) preamble
includes the phrase: "Noting in particular resolution MRE/RES.5/93 adopted by the Foreign
Ministers of the Organization of American States in Managua, Nicaragua, on 6 June 1993." The
OAS resolution condemned the coup in Haiti.
121. ADEBAJO, supra note 11, at 247 (discussing regional spoilers in sanctions regimes in
Sierra Leone).
122. See Ruth Marcus & Barton Gellman, US. Sends Ships to Enforce Embargo; Human
Rights Evacuatedfrom Haiti, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1993.
123. Eleventh Report ofthe Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
Addendum Annex: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone: Contributions as at 5 September 2001
[S/2001/857/Add. 1].
124. Michael Evans, Cook Sends Troops to SierraLeone, TIMES(London), May 8, 2000. No
concurrent action was taken in the Security Council.
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last in September of 1994 (a period of slightly more than one year), the
conflict in West Africa raged for over a decade without significant on-theground involvement from the United Nations.'25
While the "facts on the ground" are not necessarily differences in legal
circumstances, they cannot be divorced from the legal debate. Law means
little in a state of anarchy. Given the absence of the Chapter VIII
authorization when the fighting began in 1997, the ECOWAS experience
in 1990 may continue to be relegated to what David Wippman calls
"'second tier' legality."' 26 According to his theory, "states or groups of
states willing to undertake interventions perceived as genuinely
humanitarian will not incur condemnation or international sanction.' 27 Yet
this conception is necessarily ad hoc, to be carried out each time such a
case develops. A far more difficult question relates to any lasting
precedent set by the ECOWAS intervention, and the extent to which these
actually change international expectations surrounding proper international
law enforcement. If those expectations do change, and regional
organizations emerge as something akin to first-responders, should
regional actors be permitted to intervene on their own accord?
The ECOWAS intervention's relative success combined with the
crescendo of legal protocols and declarations supporting robust security
cooperation within ECOWAS, suggest this decision may have already
been made regardless of the international community's preferences. Few
would argue that both Liberia and Sierra Leone are better off today than
they were before the ECOWAS interventions. While neither may be
paragons of peace and prosperity, it is dangerous for Western observers to
hold up impossible standards against which to judge the propriety of
regional law enforcement.
Democracy in Conarky or Freetown may not mirror that in Washington
or Westminster, but that does not diminish the great progress achieved by
ECOWAS in concert with the United Nations, once it eventually arrived.
In the interim, however, ECOWAS was compelled to act. While the
Chapter VIII construction of the Security Council deputizing a given
regional organization makes sense in theory, in practice, it is an awkward

125. While the civil war in Liberia began in 1989, eventually spreading to Sierra Leone, the
United Nations sent only an Observer Force to Liberia in the mid-i 990s (UNOMIL-created by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 866 (S/RES/866 [1993]) and terminated by UNSCR 1116
(S/RES/I 116 [1997]). The first significant peacekeeping troops (6,000 military personnel) were
authorized to intervene in Sierra Leone in 1999-UNAMSIL-under Security Council Resolution
1270 (S/RES/1270 [1999]).
126. Wippman, supra note 15, at 193.
127. Id.
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rubber stamp. A more effective construction would set sufficiently high
governance standards for regional organizations seeking recognition
within the U.N. framework. Coupled with a grant of provisional authority
to respond to regional crisis as the regional organization sees fit, such an
arrangement would potentially increase effectiveness. If the regional
decisionmaking procedures are sanctioned by the United Nations, so too
should the actions justified by those decisions be sanctioned.
While scholars will likely require the perspective of further years to
judge this moment in history, the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone
may very well come to epitomize a fundamental shift in international law
enforcement mechanisms. In recognition of the limits of self-interest and
their own limited capacity, countries at the center of the international
enforcement regime should support regional organizations and clarify and
update the relationship between the United Nations and regional
associations. By doing so, countries can avoid legal ambiguity and
embrace the contemporary reality.
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